Standing Committee E

[Mr. Peter Atkinson in the Chair]

Health and Social Care(Community Health and Standards) Bill

Clause 138 - Applications for certificates of NHS charges

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Gary Streeter: I have a couple of questions with which I am sure the Minister will be able to deal with his usual aplomb, style and accuracy.
 This part of the Bill deals with England, Scotland and Wales. Clause 138(1) refers to how a person may apply for a certificate and states that they may apply to the Secretary of State, to Scottish Ministers or both. What happens if the claim is in relation to Wales? Why is there no reference to the Welsh Assembly or the Secretary of State for Wales? If there was such a reference to the Secretary of State for Wales, to what address does he recommend that the complaint be forwarded? Would it be an English address in London or an address in Cardiff?

Simon Burns: Or to the Department for Constitutional Affairs?

Gary Streeter: My hon. Friend anticipates my next sentence. Should the clause include a reference to a constitutional affairs personage? We need clarification, given the events of the past few days.
 In the midst of my questions there is a serious point about what happens to an application in relation to Wales. All through this part of the Bill, Wales seems to have been excluded, but earlier the Minister mentioned people referring or applying to the Welsh Assembly. I may be missing something in the translation, but perhaps he could deal with those issues.

John Hutton: There is a simple answer to the hon. Gentleman's point. This is not a devolved matter, so my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State acts for England and Wales in the operation of the scheme. That is why there is no need for an application specifically to the Welsh Assembly.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 138 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 139 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 140 - Information contained in certificates

John Hutton: I beg to move amendment No. 563, in
clause 140, page 63, line 2, leave out ', Wales' and insert 'and Wales'.

Peter Atkinson: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 564 to 568.

John Hutton: I would be the first to acknowledge that these amendments look long and complicated, but they have an important purpose. One of the more significant differences between the proposed new recovery scheme and the existing road traffic scheme is that we propose to allow formal court findings of contributory negligence to be taken into account when the amount of NHS charges is calculated. If a court, by one of the methods set out in clauses 140 and 143, establishes or agrees that the amount of compensation to be paid should be reduced by, for example, 20 per cent. to reflect the injured person's share of responsibility, the amount of NHS charges would be correspondingly reduced by the same proportion. However, we have identified that the Bill does not fully give effect to that policy intention.
 The extension of the scheme to all sorts of personal injury means that it will be entirely feasible that successful compensation cases that attract NHS charges could be made under Northern Ireland law or, indeed, under the law of other countries. For example, if someone goes on holiday to France and is injured in their hotel, the injured patient might be stabilised in hospital in France, then transferred home to England and perhaps spend a further week or more in hospital here. If that person subsequently brings a claim against the French owner of that hotel and the French court decides that he was partly responsible for the incident that caused the injury, it might formally enter a finding that the damages to be paid should be reduced by the proportionate amount. The compensation payment would attract NHS charges under the expanded scheme but, at present, there is no facility in the Bill for the French court's contributory negligence finding to be taken into account when calculating the amount due. That, clearly, would be neither right nor fair. We want to ensure that anybody making a compensation payment, wherever he or she is from, is treated in the same way by the recovery scheme. The amendments would have that effect. They would also have an equivalent effect in relation to contributory negligence provisions in Northern Ireland. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 564, in 
clause 140, page 63, line 4, at end insert— 
 '( ) in respect of which a court in Northern Ireland has ordered a reduction of damages in accordance with section 2 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (Northern Ireland) 1948 (c.23), 
 ( ) in respect of which a court in a country other than England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland has ordered a reduction of damages under any provision of the law of that country which appears to the Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers (as the case may be) to correspond to section 1 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (c.28),'.
 No. 565, in 
clause 140, page 63, line 5, leave out 'or Wales' and insert 
 'and Wales or Northern Ireland'.
 No. 566, in 
clause 140, page 63, line 10, leave out second 'or'. 
No. 567, in 
clause 140, page 63, line 14, at end insert— 
 '( ) in respect of which a document has been made under any provision of the law of a country other than England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland— 
 (i) which appears to the Secretary of State to correspond to an agreed judgement or order entered or sealed by an officer of a court in England and Wales, and 
 (ii) which specifies the matters mentioned in paragraph (b)(i) and (ii), or 
 ( ) in the case of which a document has been made under any provision of the law of a country other than England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland— 
 (i) which appears to the Scottish Ministers to correspond to a joint minute executed by the parties to a resulting action before a court in Scotland specifying that the action has been settled extrajudicially, and 
 (ii) which specifies the matters mentioned in paragraph (b)(i) and (ii),'.—[Mr. Hutton.]
 Clause 140, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 141 - Payment of NHS charges

Simon Burns: I beg to move amendment No. 614, in
clause 141, page 64, line 27, leave out '14' and insert '60'.

Peter Atkinson: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 613, in
clause 141, page 64, line 30, leave out from second 'of' to end of line 31 and insert 
 '90 days following the completion of any outstanding treatment.'.
 No. 615, in 
clause 141, page 64, line 30, leave out '14' and insert '60'.

Simon Burns: Clause 141 deals with the nuts and bolts of payment of NHS charges. Subsection (1) provides that, where a certificate is issued before settlement of a claim, payment must be made within 14 days of that settlement. We do not understand why the limit has been set at only 14 days, and seek, through the amendments, to increase it to 60 days. As the Minister will appreciate, when one is dealing with any organisation as large and—I do not mean this as a criticism—as bureaucratic as the NHS, 14 days is a relatively short period. There could be significant problems if that is all that is allowed. We believe that 60 days is more realistic, notwithstanding the fact that we understand the desire to put pressure on the system to ensure that the money is paid reasonably quickly and the matter is not strung out. Perhaps the Minister can explain the Government's reasoning.

Andrew Lansley: The argument is pretty straightforward but, at the risk of prolonging the debate, prompt payment codes of practice generally work on the basis of a 30-day payment schedule. That kind of limit is in the code of practice of the Confederation of British Industry. Although my hon. Friend proposes 60 days to make a point, would he agree that, in practice, 30 days is more akin to the prompt payment standard that is applied by organisations?

Simon Burns: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Logically, because he draws attention to the CBI code of practice, he is right, although he would not
 expect me to agree automatically—for reasons that I shall explain—that 30 days is better than 60 days. I am not likely to repudiate my own amendment at this stage.

Jon Owen Jones: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Simon Burns: I am not sure that it is wise.

Jon Owen Jones: I support the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire (Mr. Lansley). Companies are entitled to claim interest on late payment of debt after 30 days, so it would be consistent to argue for a 30-day deadline rather than for a much longer one.

Simon Burns: The hon. Gentleman probably has a point, but let me explain why I decided on 60 days rather than 30 days. Believe it or not, there is a logic to my thinking. It is important and reasonable that businesses, or people who owe debts to businesses, pay their debts promptly. As my hon. Friend the Member for South Cambridgeshire has rightly identified, 30 days has been seen as a reasonable time to take.
 We are dealing with both the private sector and the public sector—the NHS—and we know from our experiences in business or as constituency MPs that bureaucracy gets in the way. The money will be paid to the NHS, which is a public body. It is not a commercial company, the financial viability and survival of which may rely on the prompt payment of bills as laid down by the code of practice. Because we are dealing with a public body—this is not meant to be derogatory, but a fair criticism—one finds time and again that there are problems with bureaucracy, and getting answers to questions before paying out money. There should be some leeway. 
 The NHS, which is the body that will expect the payment, cannot go bankrupt. It is not reliant on commercial forces, fortunately, in the way that a business is. For the system to run smoothly, 60 days is a realistic time scale given those factors, although it is not in the code of practice for prompt payment.

Jon Owen Jones: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Simon Burns: With a heavy heart, I shall.

Jon Owen Jones: The legislation to introduce the payment of debt was first proposed by me in a private Member's Bill. As a result, I know that it applies to public bodies as well as private companies. They are liable to interest on debt if they pay their creditors after 30 days. Public bodies enter into contracts with private companies in the same way that private companies enter such contracts.

Simon Burns: I fully understand that, but I would be interested to know in which year the hon. Gentleman introduced his proposals.

Jon Owen Jones: 1996.

Simon Burns: I thought that it was my hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates) who first introduced such legislation in 1989 or 1990, which is a few years before 1996. However, both hon. Members' legislation concerned prompt payment primarily to private companies.
 The clause is ultimately about prompt payment to a public body, the NHS. Given that there will be some 
 bureaucracy involved, and that we are dealing with a public body and insurance companies, 14 days is probably a little unrealistic. My hon. Friend the Member for South Cambridgeshire mentions 30 days, which is reasonable in the round, but because we are dealing with a public body, we should be more lenient.

Stephen McCabe: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Simon Burns: No, I will not.
 Ultimately, a public body cannot go bust, and is not under the same commercial pressures, so a compromise of 60 days, notwithstanding what my hon. Friend and other hon. Members might think, is a reasonable compromise.

Gary Streeter: I congratulate my hon. Friend on the wisdom of his proposals. We have had a miserly response from the Minister to many of our amendments over the past few weeks, despite the overwhelmingly logical case that has been put for them. In going for a 60-day period—the time limit in the Bill is 14 days—my hon. Friend may well be coaxing the Minister to meet him halfway, which is a powerful negotiating point that the Minister might like to bear in mind.

Simon Burns: I am grateful to my hon. Friend because he has made a sensible point. We were privileged to serve together in the Whips Office in a previous life so we know each other rather well. He has recognised that I am an eminently reasonable person and that my modus operandi is to seek to help the Government to avoid the pitfalls that may become apparent if they are not prepared to be reasonable and to reach a compromise. As a result of a compromise, we may end up with exactly what my hon. Friend the Member for South Cambridgeshire is suggesting. Given that his suggestion ties in with the CBI code of practice, everyone will be happy.
 Turning to amendment No. 613, clause 141(2) states that where a certificate 
''is issued on or after the settlement date, that amount must be paid before the end of the period of 14 days''.
 Again, I would like the Minister to explain why a 14-day period has been chosen. Our amendment seeks to set a more realistic time scale for the completion of the transactions. In the light of this short debate, I hope that the Minister will see that we have made our proposals in a spirit of good will to try to improve the system and to recognise the realities of the situation. He may feel that he is being a little harsh and—this is not a criticism of him—that the time scales that he is suggesting are unrealistic.

Patsy Calton: Perhaps I can help by making a point that the hon. Gentleman has not made. Fourteen days will be far too short a time in which to consider an appeal, which will be against either a decision to make a reduction or—this point is made in later clauses—the original amount because a mistake has been made.

Simon Burns: The hon. Lady makes a powerful point, which adds weight to the argument for a more liberal
 regime. I hope that her intervention will impact on the Minister's thinking. It will be interesting to hear his response to our helpful amendments.

John Hutton: The debate was livelier than many of us had assumed that it would be. I congratulate the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire on his telling contribution.
 I must make a couple of obvious points to the hon. Members for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) and for Cheadle (Mrs. Calton). First, the 14-day limit currently applies to the existing road traffic accident compensation cost recovery scheme, which has operated for several years and has not caused any of the difficulties that the hon. Gentleman assumes that this time limit will cause. Secondly—this is more important—because of the existence of the cost recovery scheme, as many as 90 per cent. of certificates are applied for in advance of settlement. The insurers—or, in this case, the compensators—will have plenty of opportunity to look at the specification of the certificate, and, if they have concerns about it, to enter the necessary reservations. 
 I would understand better the hon. Gentleman's general point about 14 days if it was not contradicted by experience of the RTA compensation scheme, and the fact that the vast majority of certificates are applied for well in advance of the settlement date, which gives insurers and compensators plenty of time to raise concerns about the accuracy of certificates. In the light of our experience of the existing scheme and my other comments, the hon. Gentleman's point does not need to be reflected in the Bill.

Andrew Lansley: The Minister seems to have a problem, because subsection (1) deals with certificates issued before the settlement date and subsection (2) with certificates issued after the settlement date. I presume that he is arguing that 14 days is reasonable in relation to subsection (1) and that, by extension, a longer period would be applicable in relation to subsection (2). If that is his main argument for 14 days, I wonder why it does not apply to subsection (2).

John Hutton: My argument is based on the pragmatic operation of the scheme. It is clearly in the interests of compensators and insurers to apply in advance of a settlement. The question then needs to be addressed of what to do in the minority of cases when that does not happen. With respect to the hon. Gentleman, I understand what he says about 30 days, but we believe that it is in everyone's best interests for the certificate of charges to be applied for well in advance. If we appear to confer a more generous period for those who do not apply in advance, I wonder what signal it will send to those who do.
 I agree that subsection (2) sends a harder message, because we have gone for the same 14-day period as applies in subsection (1). I can only repeat my message about the operation of the RTA scheme. The vast majority of insurers apply well in advance. That is the right thing to do. As for the small minority who do not, we have to balance the national health service's need for prompt payment with the need of insurers to have plenty of time to check the accuracy of the 
 certificate. When it came to balancing those two questions, we decided that the balance of the argument rested in favour of the NHS, and of the compensation being paid to the NHS at the earliest possible moment. That was the right place to have drawn the line.

Simon Burns: I am grateful for that explanation. I am pleasantly surprised that under the existing RTA scheme, the time scale is working successfully in the vast majority of cases; I am not in a position to dispute that, nor to extrapolate whether, under the new regime, that will change. I take the Minister's optimism at face value. I hope for everyone's sake that he is right, but I am not in a position to question it. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 141 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 142 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 143 - Review of certificates

Amendment made: No. 568, in 
clause 143, page 65, line 43, leave out subsection (1) and insert— 
 '( ) The Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers must review a certificate issued by him or them if the certificate relates to a claim made by or on behalf of an injured person— 
 (a) in respect of which, after the certificate is issued, a court in England and Wales or Scotland orders a reduction of damages in accordance with section 1 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (c.28), 
 (b) in respect of which, after the certificate is issued, a court in Northern Ireland orders a reduction of damages in accordance with section 2 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (Northern Ireland) 1948 (c.23), 
 (c) in respect of which, after the certificate is issued, a court in a country other than England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland orders a reduction of damages under any provision of the law of that country which appears to the Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers (as the case may be) to correspond to section 1 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (c.28), 
 (d) in respect of which, after the certificate is issued, an officer of a court in England and Wales or Northern Ireland enters or seals an agreed judgement or order which specifies— 
 (i) that the damages are to be reduced to reflect the injured person's share in the responsibility for the injury in question, and 
 (ii) the amount or proportion by which they are to be so reduced, 
 (e) in the case of which, after the certificate is issued, the parties to any resulting action before a court in Scotland execute a joint minute which specifies— 
 (i) that the action has been settled extrajudicially, and 
 (ii) the matters mentioned in paragraph (d)(i) and (ii), 
 (f) in respect of which, after the certificate is issued, a document is made under any provision of the law of a country other than England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland— 
 (i) which appears to the Secretary of State to correspond to an agreed judgement or order entered or sealed by an officer of a court in England and Wales, and 
 (ii) which specifies the matters mentioned in paragraph (d)(i) and (ii), or 
 (g) in the case of which, after the certificate is issued, a document is made under any provision of the law of a country other than England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland— 
 (i) which appears to the Scottish Ministers to correspond to a joint minute executed by the parties to a resulting action before a court in Scotland, specifying that the action has been settled extrajudicially, and 
 (ii) which specifies the matters mentioned in paragraph (d)(i) and (ii), 
 and notification of the order, judgement, minute or document has been given to the Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers (as the case may be) in the prescribed manner.'.—[Mr. Hutton.]
 Clause 143, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 144 - Appeal against a certificate

John Hutton: I beg to move amendment No. 569, in
clause 144, page 67, line 16, at end insert 
 '(subject to subsection (3A) and sections 145(5A) and 146(4A))'.

Peter Atkinson: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 571 to 574.

John Hutton: Under the road traffic accident recovery scheme, compensators are required to pay any NHS charges that are due before they can appeal against the level of those charges. The aim behind those provisions was to minimise spurious appeals and that tended only to delay the payment of charges that were due. As the scheme takes into account only payments made by insurers under provisions in the Road Traffic Act 1988, making an appeal would never be likely to cause severe financial hardship to the compensator. However, it is possible that NHS charges could, under the new scheme, be deemed payable by small businesses or individuals. That would only arise if the person or body concerned had made a compensation payment, but there may be a small number of uninsured individuals for whom the additional payment of NHS charges could cause exceptional financial hardship, only to lead to money being refunded in the event of a successful appeal.
 Concerns have been expressed that that may be seen as effectively denying compensators access to independent right of appeal. Ministers therefore agreed that in exceptional cases the power to waive payment prior to appeal should be included in the Bill. I hope that Committee members will find that concession helpful, especially in the light of some of the comments that have been made about the impact of the provisions on small businesses. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 570, in 
clause 144, page 67, line 20, after first 'of', insert 
 ', or paragraph 10(2)(a) of Schedule 6 to,'.
 No. 571, in 
clause 144, page 67, line 23, at end insert— 
 '(3A) The Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers may, on an application by the person to whom the certificate was issued, waive the requirement in subsection (2)(b) that payment of the amount (or amounts) specified in the certificate be made before making an appeal. 
 (3B) The Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers may only grant a waiver if it appears to him or them that payment of the 
amount (or amounts) specified in the certificate would cause exceptional financial hardship. 
 (3C) An appeal against a decision of the Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers on an application under subsection (3A) (referred to in this section and sections 145 and 146 as a 'waiver decision') may be made by the person to whom the certificate was issued.'.
 No. 572, in 
clause 144, page 67, line 25, after 'appeal', insert 
 'against a certificate or waiver decision'.
 No. 573, in 
clause 144, page 67, line 27, after 'appeal', insert 
 'against a certificate or waiver decision'.
 No. 574, in 
clause 144, page 67, line 32, after 'appeal', insert 'against a certificate'.—[Mr. Hutton.]
 Clause 144, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 145 - Appeal tribunals

Amendments made: No. 575, in 
clause 145, page 67, line 35, leave out from 'refer' to end of line 37 and insert 
 'to an appeal tribunal constituted under Chapter 1 of Part 1 of the Social Security Act 1998 (c.14) an appeal against— 
 (a) a certificate, or 
 (b) a waiver decision.'.
 No. 576, in 
clause 145, page 67, line 38, after 'appeal', insert 'against a certificate'.
 No. 577, in 
clause 145, page 67, line 41, after 'appeal', insert 'against a certificate'.
 No. 578, in 
clause 145, page 68, line 2, after 'appeal', insert 'against a certificate'.
 No. 579, in 
clause 145, page 68, line 8, at end insert— 
 '(5A) On an appeal against a waiver decision, the tribunal may— 
 (a) confirm the decision, or 
 (b) waive the requirement in question.'.—[Mr. Hutton.]
 Clause 145, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 146 - Appeal to Social Security Commissioner

Amendments made: No. 580, in 
clause 146, page 68, line 24, leave out from 'above' to 'apply' and insert 
 'to an appeal against a decision of an appeal tribunal under subsection (3) of section 145, subsections (2) to (4) of that section'.
 No. 581, in 
clause 146, page 68, line 25, leave out 'subsection (1)' and insert 'subsection (1)(a)'.
 No. 582, in 
clause 146, page 68, line 26, at end insert— 
 '(4A) In a case in which subsection (7) or (8)(b) of section 14 of the 1998 Act applies by virtue of subsection (3) above to an appeal against a decision of an appeal tribunal under subsection (5A) of section 145, the appeal tribunal may— 
 (a) confirm the waiver decision, or 
 (b) waive the requirement in question.'.
 No. 583, in 
clause 146, page 68, line 28, leave out from 'above' to 'applies' and insert 
 'to an appeal against a decision of an appeal tribunal under subsection (3) of section 145, subsection (4) of that section'.
 No. 584, in 
clause 146, page 68, line 29, after 'appeal', insert 'against a certificate'.—[Mr. Hutton.]
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Andrew Lansley: We are moving very fast, but I want to ask a question about the clause before we approve it.
 Subsection (1) says: 
''on the ground that the decision was erroneous in point of law.''
 I am not sure that I understand where somebody would go if they regarded a decision on procedure as flawed. The Minister might tell me if I am wrong, but am I to assume that somebody who believed that a certificate issued to them was erroneous on procedural grounds, and wished to subject that to judicial review, would have to go outside the appeal process to the High Court? Do the words 
''erroneous in point of law''
 refer to grounds of judicial review? Somebody who was appealing against the issuing of a certificate could not appeal on grounds of judicial review to the appeal tribunal; they would have to appeal on such grounds to a higher tribunal or court. Is the social security commissioner equipped to hear appeals on judicial review grounds or not? Is he confined to specific grounds of social security law?

John Hutton: The Bill does not supply provisions on judicial review and the provisions in the clause are not an alternative to judicial review. The whole scheme, including the actions of the Scottish Ministers and the Secretary of State, will remain subject to the normal operation of judicial review. In other words, decisions are perhaps outside the powers of the scheme. Judicial review is a possibility.
 We discussed earlier how other kinds of appeals would be dealt with—admittedly, rather quickly. Clauses 144 and 145 deal with substantive issues around an error or inaccuracy on the certificate. If might be helpful if I explain clause 146 for the hon. Gentleman. 
 Given that the intention is for appeals to be heard by the Appeals Service, it is only right that those subject to that appeals mechanism should have the same rights as others to pursue their cases if they believed that the appeal decision was wrong in law. The clause gives the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers, and the compensator, that right of onward appeal to a social security commissioner. It sets out the powers of the commissioner in dealing with cases by reference to the powers set out in section 14 of the Social Security Act 1998—that is, he may either determine a case himself or refer it back to a tribunal for decision with directions. 
 If the commissioner refers a case back to the tribunal, the tribunal will be required to act in accordance with his directions in determining the appeal, and the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers will have to abide by the tribunal's decision. If the commissioner determines the case himself, the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers will be required to act in accordance with that decision. The clause provides for onward appeal by either party, but only on points of law, to a social security commissioner. It does not by-pass or oust the normal judicial review procedures that apply to the operation of the scheme. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 146, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 147 - Provision of information

Simon Burns: I beg to move amendment No. 627, in
clause 147, page 69, line 13, leave out subsection (2).
 This is a probing amendment, and I shall be extremely brief. The system of recovery of NHS charges relies on information being exchanged by the various parties involved in the chain of events from accident to payment of compensation. That is wholly sensible. However, I want to know a little more about the definitions in subsection (2). In one way, they are straightforward, but they cover a multitude of sins—or at least a lack of information. 
 Subsection (2) states that a person is required to give information 
''in the prescribed manner, and . . . within the prescribed period.''
 Could the Minister tell us exactly what he anticipates will be the prescribed manner and—this is most important, given the subject of an earlier debate—what he anticipates will be the prescribed period?

John Hutton: As with the road traffic accident cost recovery scheme, a scheme such as this cannot operate effectively unless its administrators have access to reliable and accurate information about incidents and compensation claims. Subsection (1) allows my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers to set out in regulations the information that must be provided to them by those listed in that subsection. Subsection (2) simply allows us to set out how the information should be provided and the time scale within which it must be made available. It reflects closely provisions in the Road Traffic (NHS Charges) Act 1999. The intention is to use the powers in clause 147 in exactly the same way as the powers set out in the road traffic scheme. It sets out what information has to be provided automatically, and when, and what information has to be requested.
 The sort of information required is likely to include basic information such as the name, address and so on of the insured and the injured persons, details of when and where the injury occurred and whether the injured 
 person received treatment from the hospital or the ambulance service. It is likely that a person against whom a claim is made will be required to provide such information automatically within a short period after the claim is made; under current regulations, it is 14 days—a period that is familiar to the hon. Gentleman. Other people, such as the injured person or the hospital providing treatment, are likely to have to provide information on request, and usually only if relevant issues require clarification. 
 We do not believe that that represents an unacceptable intrusion into an injured person's privacy—we would not want the scheme to operate in such a way—nor do we believe that it is unreasonable to set time limits within which such information should be provided. If we did not, unscrupulous compensators could put off providing information indefinitely as a delaying tactic to avoid paying those NHS charges for which the Bill would make them liable. That would not be in the public interest.

Simon Burns: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 147 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 148 - Use of information held by the Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers etc.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Patsy Calton: I have only one question and it is contingent on clause 147. The Minister indicated that information would be required, which is proper. However, a number of organisations are concerned that that information may be used for other purposes, and that it could be used under clause 148 to recover benefits. Will the Minister reassure the Committee that the provisions of clause 147 will not be used to allow a fishing expedition for information that could be used under clause 148?

John Hutton: I am sure that all hon. Members understand why it is necessary to share information effectively between the existing benefits recovery schemes and the new NHS cost recovery scheme. The Bill reflects provisions contained in section 12 of the Road Traffic (NHS Charges) Act 1999, which allow information to be shared between the benefits recovery scheme and the road traffic scheme. We are not doing anything new in the Bill; and we are not trying to smuggle through a snooper's charter.
 Much of the information required for the benefit recovery scheme is the same as that required by the NHS cost recovery scheme. The hon. Lady will know that the schemes are currently administrated by the same organisation—the compensation recovery unit within the Department for Work and Pensions. It is intended that the same organisation will operate the new NHS recovery scheme. 
 It would be bureaucratically unwise for those CRU staff who deal with benefits recovery to have to work in complete isolation from those working on NHS 
 recoveries. It would mean both groups of staff sending requests for the same information to the same people, with a repeated duplication of letters, data entries, and so on. The clause will ensure that that does not happen by allowing information obtained by one unit to be shared with the other; that will minimise the administrative burden on all involved, including compensators and hospitals. However, that is the extent and limit to which information can be shared under the clause. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 148 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 149 - Payment of NHS charges to hospitals or ambulance trusts

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Andrew Lansley: I have a simple question, and I hope that the answer will equally simple. Under clause 15, as amended, private charges for care provided to patients, other than patients being provided with goods and services for the purposes of the health service, will be the subject of a cap for NHS foundation trusts. Can we be sure that charges made pursuant to this part of the Bill will not be defined as private charges for the purposes of the cap on NHS foundation trust income from private charges? If they are, trust income from private charges would be
 variable, depending on how many road traffic accidents and injuries at work were treated.

John Hutton: The reality is that if someone who was injured and who therefore came within the scope of the cost recovery scheme were to be treated as a private patient by the NHS, that income would clearly count and score against the private income cap. If the money were to be recovered, it certainly would not count as double counting of the same amount; but if the patient receives private treatment from the hospital, there is no doubt that it would score under clause 15. However, it would not be scored twice if the costs were recovered.

Andrew Lansley: The Minister interprets my question in a way that is more complex than I intended. I understand that private patients will incur private charges. My question is whether the fact that treatment of an NHS patient is chargeable under the scheme will count towards the cap.

John Hutton: It will certainly not score on that basis.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 149 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 150 to 156 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Further consideration adjourned—[Jim Fitzpatrick.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at nine minutes past Three o'clock till Thursday 19 June at five minutes to Nine o'clock.